Introduction.
This report concentrates on implementation issues associated with the security model for object-oriented databases introduced by Jajodia and Kogan 14]. The single most important point that we will try to make here is that the nature of our nmodel is such that it already contains the recipes for implementation. In other words, it would be wise to consider the questions of the model and its implementation in a highly integrated way rather than to place them at related but separate conceptual levels.
Because of the preceding consideration we think it advisable to start this report with a brief but self-contained description of the model of [4] .
The main motivation of our work in [4] was to construct a security model that would integrate in a very natural way with an object-oriented model rather than juxtapose with it. To that end we decided to move away from the traditional object-subject paradigm of Bel! and LaPadula [2] for mulilevel security. In its place we introduced a new paradigm whose main elements were objects (in the new, object-oriented sense) and messages.
In an object-oriented data model, the notion of object is rather different from the Bell-LaPadula notion of object. Whereas the latter is simply a file, or a record, or a field, the former can be regarded as a passive repository of data and, at tie same time, as an active agent manipulating those data and communicating with other objects. It seems natural, therefore, that such objects be viewed as units of security. Perhaps the most important consequence of adopting such a view is that, due to the property of encapsulation,t information flow becomes explicit (in the fonr of message exchange among + Encapsulation of objects -a fundamental property of object-oriented syŽ•tems -means that only objects themselves can have direct access to their internal state (their attributcs). For anyone -4-objects) and, therefore, easy to control. Thus, the notion of encapsulation, which was originally introduced in object-oriented systems to facilitate modular design, can now be employed for purposes of security. The conceptual clarity and simplicity of the model translates into simplicity of design of security mechanisms.
An informal view of the model describes the system as cons; ;ting of objects that are assigned unique security classifications. Objects can communicate among themselves only by means of sending messages. Messages cannot, however, flow directly from one object to another. Instead, they have to be screened by a security module that decides how to handle any given message based on the security classifications of the sender and the intended receiver as well as some additional information. The rulings issued by this module embody the security policy.
Section 2 is reproduced from [4] . In it, we define our formal object-oriented data model. Section 3 is an exposition of the security model rendered in such a fashion as to address implementation concerns more explicitly than it was done in [4] . Section 4 explains why our model is conceptually easy to implement in object-oriented environments. Section 5 discusses some alternatives for implementation of object-oriented databases based on our model, particularly the issue of which elements of the system have to be trusted. Section 6 addresses some requirements placed by our model on the implementation of the object layer. Finally, Section 7 ends this report with some concluding remarks and observations. else to access the object's state, it is necessary to send a message to that object.
2. Object-Oriented Data Model.
An object-oriented database is a collection of objects communicating via messages.
Each object consists of a unique identifier, a set of attributes and a set of methods, thc latter being essentially pieces of code. Each attribute has a value, which can chanec over time.
An object can invoke one of its methods in response to a message received fiomn another object. A method invocation can, in turn, (1) directly access an attribuie hclonging to the object (read or change its value); (2) invoke other methods belonging to the object; (3) send a message to another object; or (4) create a new object.
There is a special type of object, called user object. A user object represents a user session with the system. User objects adlner from regular objects in that, in addition to being able to invoke methods in response to messages, they can also invoke methods spontaneously.t User object can be created only by the system, at the login time. The notion of spontaneous method invocation may seem rather arbitrary at first. It is, however, nccessaq! in order to avoid running into a version of the chicken-and-cgg paradox. Namely, if a message can be. sent only through a method invocation (see property (3) of method invocations) and if a method can be activated only by a message received from another object, then how does any processing in such a system ever get initiated? (One has to insist that cither the egg or the chicken come first.) In reality, we want a user to be able to initiate a system activity, e.g., by typing a string of characters on the keyboard. This would serve as a signal for the corresponding user object to initiate a method. We choose to think of this as a "spontaneous" initiation, because the keyboard and any signals that it sends are external to our model. 
1,

Vk)
where vj E Vforallj (1 j 5 k), and g cM. 0
Definition 1 states that an object is defined by its identifier, an ordered set of attribute names, an ordered set of corresponding values, and a set of methods. We assume that every object has a unique identifier, i.e., for any two objects o, = (i, as v, ,i) anid
The uniqueness of object identity is commonly considered a fundamental propertv of object-oriented syst... ..
1..
We will use the following notation in the foregoing discussion. Let Similarly to the nctation used for objects, we let hi ( g), p ( g), and r( g) denote the name, the parameter list, and the return value of message g respectively.
An object sends a message by invoking a system primitive SEND ( g, i) where i is the identifier of the receiver object. The value r( g) is computed by the method activated in the receiver upon the arrival of g there and returned to the sender.'
In the literature on object-oriented data models, the response to a message is oftcrdefined as a return object. We use the notion of variable instead, in order to avoid dealing with the issue of accessing the state of the return object, which, in compliance with the property of encapsulation, would have to be done via message sending (unless the return object is a primitive object). Sending messages to an object that has been returned in response to another message seems conceptually cumbersome. The notion of variable, on the other hand, implies direct accessibility without the need to resort to message sending. Of course, return variables should be allowed to have arbitrarily complex structure if we do not want to lose the modeling power associated with objects.
Definition 3. The interface f, of object o is a function fo:
where H is a set of all possible message names. fl
The interface of object o determines which messages o responds to. Those are the messages whose names, Ih, are such that f 0 ( h) ;e void. If fo( It) = void, o does not respond to messages whose name is It. Moreover, the interface determines which particular method, out of the set of methods, p( o), defined for object o, is to be invoked, depending on the name of the given message.
We have defined methods as strings of code. Now we are in a position to give a more formal definition of methods.
As we shall see in the next section, sometimes the security component of the system will have to interfere :n the matter of computing r ( g). respectively; and vj is returned to the sender of g. Notc that for some k we could have ik = i ( o), i.e., an object can send a message to itself. This, for instance, can serve as a mechanism for invoking other methods within the same object.
Objects are used to model real-world entities.t This is done by associating properties, or facets, of an entity with attributes of the corresponding object. The attribute values are, then, instantiations of those properties. For instance, a country can be represented in a geographic object-oriented database by an object a where a ( o)= (COUNTRYNAME, POPULATION, CAPITAL,, NATIONAILFLAG,
i(03)). T'he "t As we will see later, a single entity may be modeled by more than one object.
values of the first and second attributes are a string and an integer, respectively; tile values of the rest of the attributes are references to other objects that, in turn, describe the capital, the national flag, and the form of government of the nation of Albania.
Note that an object's methods, unlike its attributes, do not have counterparts in the real-world entity modeled by tile object. Tile purpose of methods is quite different. It is to provide support for basic database functionality such as querying and updating objects.
A realistic object-oriented model should also contain the notion of constraints. For instance, an attribute of an object may be allowed to assume values only from a restricted subset of domains or object identifiers. To simplify the exposition, we choose to disregard the issue of constraints in this report. I lowever, it should be a simple rmatter to incorporatc this notion in our security--data model.
3.
Object-Oriented Security Model.
The system consists of a set 0 of objects (see Definition 1) and a partially ordered set S of security levels with ordering relation <. A level Si E S is said to be dominated by another level Sj e S, this being denoted by Si <-Si, if i = or Si < Si. For two levels Si and Sj that are unordered by <, we write Si < > Si.
There is a total function L: 0 "ihc indirect flow occurs betvween two objects that do not eXchange messages with each other but, instcad, exchange messages with a third object; the latter is riot, howscic, threctln atlectcd liv the flov, (unlik" the case of the transitive l•,ow).
As a:gucd in 14l. for an otbject to acquire intonuation, time viues of some ,f it, asttributes ,,nust tx" changed Therefore, one can prevent an illegal forward infonnation ilo%% b\ making sure that no such changes occur as a result of a nwthod invocation in response it a message. Similarly, an illegal backward flow is prevented by returning uil in response to a message. Note that nil is also retunied when the messyge is undeliverable ftor whatever rcamon (e.g.. the targct object does not exist). Next, by definition, if no illcgal fomrx ard or backwaid tlow., are allowed, nO illegal transitive flow can occur either.
li-iall, toi pre ent illegal indirect information flows, one lutist ensure that a mcntho. P, pre\ etlied Irein updatimg amn local attributcs iside the object if the mllellhod is invoked iMi response io a me•sage from anotLer object tlhat is at a higher or umrclated sccurily level.
Ths Message Filtering Algorithm
To control all the types of information flow described above, the message filtering algorithm was introduced in 141. The idea that information flow be controlled by controlling the flow of messages requires that all basic object activity --such as access to internal attributes, new object creation, and invocation of local methods -be implemented by allowing an object to send messages to itself!t These are built-in, or system-defined, messages. This means that a response to such a message is carried out directly by thei systems, according to some pre-defined semantics, rather than by the invocation of a user-defined metho.. 
Every method invocation t has a stats s ( t).
The status is either U (unrestricted) or R (restricted). The default is U.
The message filtering algorithm is the core of our security model. The effect of making this sCcurity-modeling choice is that all infomaation-transfer-related activity is ri.ndered explicit in the formi of message sending. This has a direct rclation to the lueCStion of implementation, for such activity is now subject to monitoring by a security module called the message filter, whose functionality is based on the message fihl in..g f Ilicre arc cxistinb, objcct-oriented database systems that, in fact, use this kind ol implementation, e.g., GemStone.
-12-algorithm. 4 . Algorithmic Nature of the Model.
Our security model has one distinctive feature that makes the question of implemrentation relatively easy to address. That is the fact that virtually the entire model can be expressed as one simple algorithm. When coded and implanted into the system that supports objects, this algorithm becomes a security module that we refer to as the mnessage filter. The role of this module is to act as an interceptor for every message originated by any object and decide how to process that message. Figure 2 shows the interaction among objects as taking place with mediation on the part of the message Slter.
Thus, the model already contains the prescription for its own implementation. This fact is due to the model's algorithmic nature. Note that this is in contrast with other existing database security models, which are constraint-based. Models of the latter kind require some additional work on mechanisms for enforcing those constraints before the actual implementation can take place. In addition, those models probably could not be implemented as a single module because the constraint checking would have to be done in a number of different logical places.
Placement of Trust, or What to Rely on.
In this section, we discuss what is perhaps one of the central implementation questions for any secure system: which components of the system need to bc trustcd.
if I = READ let g pass
let g pass (4) if h = INVOKE let g pass; s ( t2) *-s ( t 1) Figure 1 . The Message Filtering Algorithm. In accordance with this approach, the central e nderlit Of OUr meul -telnessloe i----15-filter -does not have to be trusted, since the actual security enforcement is done at the operating system level by the reference monitor. The latter checks all data access requests submitted to the operating system by user processes to make sure that no violations of the access policy occur.
The TDI approach is the widely used way of dealing with database security requirements. Examples are the SeaView model [1, 3] and the security model for objectoriented applications developed at SRI [6] . Our security model can be just as easily implemented using the TDI approach as the above two. In this implementation, the message filter would provide the database interpretation for the actual enforcement of the security policy by the reference monitor. The reference monitor would have to be trusted; h!e message filter wouldi not. But first, it would be useful to compare the functionality and role of a message lilter with those of a reference monitor. There is an interesting parallel between the two. The function of both is to control information-transfer activity in the system, based on the presumption that (1) all such activity is carried out using a predefined set of primitives,
-16-and (2) an instance of usage of a primitive can always be detected and acted upon appropriately by the security module (a message filter or reference monitor) with the objective of preventing illegal information flows. In the case of reference monitor, the primitives are data access requests submitted to the operating system by an active process (usually in the form of system calls). In the case of message filter, the primitives are messages sent by method invocations.
The majority of actual computer systems today are implemented using data access calls. That is why the notion of reference monitor is both natural and effective.
Imagine, however, that messages replaced data access calls as the basic primitive.
Then it would be just as natural and easy to guard against illegal information transfer using a message filter as it was using a reference monitor in the case of data access calls.
Such an assumption is not far fetched at all since systems exist built on the message send-
Thus, when messages replace data access calls as primitives, a message filter should replace a reference monitor as the enforcer of security. The placement of trust, then, shifts from the latter to the former, i.e., the former must now be trusted and the latter disappears completely. Such state of affairs seems quite favorable to our model of database security as well as to the problem of secure object-oriented databases in general.
The reason for this is that there is no longer a separation between secrtity enforcement and its interpretation: they have become one and the same. Thc messav, filter does not rely any more on any underlying security kernel but rather enforcce security directly by regulating the flow of messages among objects. This ý;ituation, we belie s, iw more effective and reliable than a two-tiered implementation of the kind of TDI.
6. Object Security and Object Implementation.
In order for our approach to object security to be effective, the implementation of.
objects themselves must satisfy certain requirements. In other words, our security model is not indifferent to how specifically the object layer is implemented.
This subject has been already touched at several points earlier in this report and especially in [4] . In this secLfn° the subject is brought into focus an6 given a brief unified treatment.
All such implementation requirements imposed by the security model can be expressed in the following general form: Every object activity related to information transfer must be implemented by message-passing. This means that in addition to interaction among objects, message-passing must also be used for the following:
(1) reading of local attributes by an object, (2) updating of local attributes, (3) invocation of local methods, and (4) inheritance (both class-instance and class-subclass).
When the above requirements are satisfied, all information activity in the system can be checked directly by the message filter. As was mentioned in [41, some existing object. oriented systems indeed implement access to local attributes and local method invocation by having an object send a primitive message to itself. The situation is analogous to a system where processes have to issue system calls in order to access data or -18,, activate a procedure. Therefore, there is nothing unusual about these requirements.
Implementing the inheritance mechanism by means of message passing is not a new concept either (e.g., see [7] ). Its essence is in redirecting of a message sent to an object such that the method called for is not physically located in the object. For example, all the methods defined for a class of objects are stored within the class object for that class.
Therefore, when a message is sent to an instance of that class, it will be redirected to the class object so that the needed method can be invoked there. Subsequently, if the method invocation requires access to the instance object's attributes, messages will be sent to the latter for that purpose. A further redirection of messages can occur if the method in question is inherited from a superclass rather than defined locally for the class.
Thus, the requirements placed by our security model on the implementation of the object layer are by no means unreasonable. However, the very fact that there are some requirements will preclude using our model with just any objec!-oriented database. We do not consider this a detriment, though, for the following reason. Our interest is in constructing an effective and comprehensive approach to security for object-oriented databases, not just coming up with minimally functional mechanisms that can be fitted on top of any existing database.
Conclusions.
We have attempted to present here an integrated treatment of the questions of security modeling and security implementation in the context of object-oriented databases.
Such methodology seems particularly appropriate because the security model that we arc using is, by its very nature, both abstract and implementation specific.
Perhaps, the most important novel idea found in this report is that of supplementing, or perhaps even replacing, the traditional reference monitor with the message filter, which seems to be a natural choice in object-oriented databases.
This report along with its companion report on the object-oriented data and security models [4] represent an initial step in what we hope will be a long-term research effort towards designing and building multilevel secure object-oriented databases.
